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13.1  Introduction and Summary 
Among industrialized countries, Italy represents one of the most interesting 
cases for applying the generational accounting methodology. The Italian econ- 
omy is characterized by one of the world's largest public debts, a very generous 
pension system, and the world's  lowest fertility rate. These three features pro- 
duce effects on public finances that reinforce themselves in the long run. 
Since the 198Os, stabilization of the ratio of public debt to GDP has rep- 
resented the main fiscal policy target. According to official figures, the target 
was reached in 1995. However, conventional debt and deficit measures, by fo- 
cusing on the very short run, ignore the pressures that the current demographic 
transition is placing on the budget. Because the elderly dependency ratio will 
increase by 50 percent in the next 20 years, public expenditures on health and 
pensions will increase substantially; at the same time, revenues will decrease 
insofar as an increasing fraction of the population will be retired. By taking the 
current demographic transition into account, generational accounting analysis 
shows that the debt outlook differs substantially from the picture obtained from 
conventional approaches. It is shown that most of  the imbalance in current 
Italian fiscal policy has nothing to do with officially labeled government debt 
and that fiscal consolidation in excess of what is needed for achieving short- 
term debt stabilization is required. When considering the future increase in per 
capita net taxes required to keep public debt on a stable path, a severe intergen- 
erational imbalance against future generations emerges. However, a substantial 
fraction of it will be removed by  the long-run effects of  the pension reform 
enacted in 1995. 
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Fig. 13.1  Ratio of public debt to GDP (central government) 
Sources: Minister0 del Tesoro (1988) and Banca d‘Italia, Reluzione Annuule (various years). 
13.2  Public Debt in a Historical Perspective 
The existence of  a large stock of  financial liabilities issued by  the public 
sector is a distinctive feature of Italian economic history. On three occasions 
(1897, 1920, and 1943) the relative size of  debt reached peaks whose orders 
of magnitude were close to current values (around 120 percent of GDP; see 
fig. 13.1). Over the years, public debt averaged 90 percent of  GDP, with the 
exception of  the 25-year spell of high economic growth and financial stability 
that followed the Second World War. From a bird‘s-eye view, the years between 
1946 and 1971 appear to be a favorable exception to the historical pattern, as 
the debt-to-GDP ratio was virtually constant at around 30 percent. 
The Italian state, founded in 1861, was burdened from the very beginning 
by  a large debt: its origin goes back to the parliamentary decision to take re- 
sponsibility for the financial liabilities issued by  the previous states,’ which 
totaled 45 percent of  GDP. The incidence of debt doubled in the following 10 
years, as a consequence of the large burst in military spending needed to gain 
the eastern temtories of the nation (Veneto) from Austria. In  1870, when the 
1. The decision was shared by  the majority and opposition parties. As pointed out by Zamagni 
(1992), the hypothesis of repudiating the debt issued by  the various states previously based on 
Italian territory was rejected in order to preserve the creditworthiness of the Italian economy in 
European financial markets. The relevance of Italian standing in the international financial com- 
munity, in  turn, reflected the structural need  for foreign savings, aimed at financing economic 
development. At the same time, oblivion of the previous states was obtained by  converting the 
various debt instruments into a new Italian public debt. Following the experience of the French 
revolution, the converted debt was accounted for in the “Great Book of Public Debt.” 301  Generational Accounts for Italy 
process of  creating the new nation ended, the magnitude of  public debt was 
close to the value of the domestic product (96 percent). 
While the government’s current target of  putting financial liabilities on a 
declining path has not yet been fully achieved, past experience shows that on 
three occasions the relative size of the Italian debt declined substantially (fig. 
13.1). A common feature of all the episodes of debt absorption is the positive 
role played by economic growth,2  reinforced by partial debt repudiation in two 
out of  three cases. In the 1898-1912  period, a moderate but steady income 
growth rate was the major source of stabilization, supplemented by fiscal con- 
solidation in some years. The first (voluntary) repudiation occurred under dic- 
tatorship. It took the form of debt consolidation3  and strengthened the effects 
of prolonged fiscal discipline during the 1921-27  period. Debt monetization 
was the form the second (invol~ntary)~  repudiation took in the years following 
the Second World War. In only four years, an average inflation rate above 100 
percent per year reduced the 118 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, which had peaked 
in 1943, to a quarter of its previous level. 
From the foundation of  the Italian republic (1948) to the end of the sixties, 
the relative size of public debt fluctuated around 30 percent. A distinctive fea- 
ture of this period of stability is the favorable macroeconomic conditions sum- 
marized in figure 13.2 by  a positive real interest rate, which was, however, 
always lower than the rate of output gr~wth.~  Under these circumstances, the 
government could even run “an honest Ponzi game” (Buiter 1985)  by financing 
interest payments through new debt issues. Starting in 1964, the government 
not only followed the above fiscal rule but even ran a primary deficit (fig. 13.3). 
Up to the end of the seventies, the rise in public debt was moderate, due to the 
2. For a detailed account of  past debt policy, see Toniolo and Ganugi (1992) and Zamagni 
(1  992). 
3. In 1926, mandatory conversion of public liabilities followed the failure of the voluntary con- 
version offered two years before. Outstanding debt was converted into consols, yielding a 5  percent 
coupon. Eight years later, the consols were converted into 25-year bonds, yielding a 3.5 interest 
rate. The decline of the debt-to-GDP ratio would be larger than it appears in fig.  13.1 if public 
debt were evaluated at market value. According to Alesina (1991), after the two conversions debt 
holders suffered an overall loss estimated to be over 50 percent of face value. As a consequence 
of the loss of reputation, the Treasury faced increasing difficulty in issuing new debt during the 
next 15 years. 
4. According to the interpretation proposed by Toniolo and Ganugi (1992, 137), hyperinflation 
was initially tolerated by the government, which tightened monetary policy after some delay. 
5.  The data shown in fig. 13.2 have to be considered with some caution. Due to lack of informa- 
tion, the interest rate refers to the effective ex post rate relative to medium- and long-term bonds 
(buoni del resoro poliennali) and not to the average interest rate paid on government debt. During 
some years, the former may not reflect overall financial conditions, as financial markets were not 
fully developed. 
Note that the excess of the growth rate over the interest rate need not imply dynamic inefficiency. 
As shown by Abel et al. (1989). in a multisector stochastic economy the interest rate on govern- 
ment bonds need not be equal to the marginal product of capital. Under an alternative test, based 
on the comparison between cash flows generated by capital and the level of investment, the authors 
dismiss the dynamic inefficiency hypothesis for Italy as well as the remaining G-7 countries in the 
1960-84  period. 302  Nicola Sartor 
Year 
Nominal Interest fate minus nominal GDP growth  -Real  ex  post interest rate  ...... 
Fig. 13.2  Interest rate on medium-term government bonds 
Sources: Minister0 del Tesoro (1988) and Banca dItalia, Bollettino Statistico (various years). 
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Fig. 13.3  General government revenues and outlays 
Sources: Morcaldo (1  993) and Banca d'Italia, Relazione Annuale (various years). 
accommodative stance of monetary policy. Figure 13.2 highlights this situation 
by showing the persistence of output growth in excess of  the interest rate, and 
also a negative ex post real interest rate over the 1973-80  period. 
At the beginning of the eighties monetary policy changed course, following 
the restrictive stance originating in the United States. The sharp increase in 
interest rates, which appeared to exceed output growth for the first time in the 
history of the Italian republic (fig. 13.2), put public debt on a path that would 303  Generational Accounts for Italy 
be unsustainable in the long run. The need for a change in budgetary policy 
was clearly perceived by  the prime minister, who in 1985 proposed the first fi- 
nancial plan to reverse debt dynamiw6  Unfortunately, belief in the need for fis- 
cal tightening was shared neither by  all ministers nor by the Parliament. 
Tko main reasons may be cited to explain the lack of willingness to undergo 
fiscal discipline. The first is the absence of any macroeconomic sign of finan- 
cial instability. The frequent calls for fiscal tightening, requested by the central 
bank and by  international organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund  and  the  Organization for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD), appeared to the political body  to  address a theoretical need  not 
founded on any tangible phenomenon. The second reason, which has been 
stressed by the recent literature on credibility and politics, lies in the way politi- 
cal institutions shape policymakers’ incentives (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 
1990; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 199  1). Parliamentary instability and 
polarization, on one hand, and disagreement among members of coalition gov- 
ernments, on the other, determine the way  the future is weighed and make 
postponement of unpopular policies a rational option. As shown by Grilli et al. 
(1991), these features seem to explain the existence of large debts and deficits 
in some industrialized countries. In the Italian case, government durability (es- 
timated in the 1950-90  period at 0.95 years) appears to be the major culprit 
because, for any individual cabinet, the probability of facing the bad conse- 
quences of deficit spending was very low. Under these circumstances, the only 
phenomenon capable of  triggering significant fiscal tightening seems to have 
been the appearance of a balance-of-payment disequilibrium, which made ad- 
justment unavoidable.’ 
An important opportunity for financial recovery was missed in the second 
half of  the eighties. Average output growth of  almost 3 percent per annum 
would have allowed debt stabilization through the implementation of a small 
discretionary tightening, as sustained growth (1) reduced the interest-growth 
rate gap and (2) automatically improved the budget via the effects of built-in 
stabilizers. This opportunity was clearly understood by the government, which 
proposed various plans for fiscal consolidation based on keeping (1) current 
outlays constant in real terms and (2) total revenues a constant share of output, 
6. In the 1985-86  period, three different financial plans were proposed by the prime minister. 
In 1986, the Parliament changed the procedure for determining the annual budget, introducing the 
“Document for Economic and Financial Planning.” The document aimed at framing the annual 
budget within a three-year macroeconomic and financial scenario consistent with debt stabiliza- 
tion. A common feature of those plans was (and still is) represented by the tendency to refer to a 
too-favorable macroeconomic environment. This, in the end, would underestimate the need for 
fiscal tightening and for additional restrictions to be adopted during the financial year, thus un- 
dermining the government’s credibility. 
7. This was the case in 1976-77  and in 1991. According to Toniolo and Ganugi (1992), fiscal 
adjustments in the 1876-1947  period were often triggered by external constraints. This tendency 
can also be found at the present time. The sole argument for fiscal tightening is represented by the 
need to fulfill the Maastricht criteria for joining in European Economic and Monetary Union. 304  Nicola Sartor 
thus letting economic growth make the adjustment. In contrast, actual fiscal 
policy was characterized by simultaneous discretionary increases in revenues 
and expenditures. Moreover, despite medium-term financial planning, a large 
part  of  the  restrictive  measures  deliberately  caused one-off  effects. In  the 
1986-90  period,  Sartor (1998b) estimates  that 46 percent of the effects of 
deficit-reducing policies had disappeared in the short run. In 1987-a  year of 
general elections-the  above proportion peaked at 80 percent. Only in 1991, 
after a severe exchange rate crisis, was a primary surplus obtained (fig. 13.3). 
Its size, however, was insufficient to stabilize the relative weight of public debt. 
Financial improvement continued in the  1991-95  period, mainly through 
increases in taxes and social security contributions (the effective overall rate 
was increased by  1.8 percentage points in the 1990-95  period). Spending cuts 
were obtained by freezing the wage bill (whose ratio to GDP declined by 1.3 
percent in the same period) and investment (its share in GDP decreased by  1  .0 
percent). If this short-term policy is not backed up by some permanent reduc- 
tion in the economic role of  the public sector, primary  spending is likely to 
reverse its recent downward trend in the coming years. So far, the only struc- 
tural change to be enacted has been the reform of public pensions. However, 
because the phase-in period is very long, the reform will not have major effects 
in the next 10 years (see Sartor 1998a on this point). 
The 15-year delay in making fiscal policy consistent with the tight monetary 
policy followed since the early eighties has caused a dramatic increase in debt, 
whose relative weight more than doubled, rising from 58 to  120 percent of 
GDP. The permanent cost of the delay is summarized by the size of the primary 
surplus needed to stabilize public debt in the short run. Assuming a 3.5 percent- 
age point difference between the interest rate and the rate of output growth- 
as will be done for the generational accounting simulations-a  primary sur- 
plus equal to 2 percent of output would have allowed debt stabilization in 1981. 
Fifteen years later, the debt-stabilizing surplus amounts to over 4 percent. 
13.3  The Economic Role of the State 
While the relevance of debt and deficits puts Italy among the countries fol- 
lowing an unorthodox financial policy, the level and structure of primary public 
expenditures (e.g., net of interest payments) are similar to those found in the 
rest of Europe, especially the continental countries. During the first half of the 
century, public intervention was mainly aimed at closing the gap between the 
young economy and  its more developed  European partners.  Public  policy 
played a pervasive role in sustaining industrial development and creating basic 
infrastructures for the unified country, thus closely resembling the German ex- 
perience. Notwithstanding  the relevance  of  interest payments,8 total public 
8. Toniolo and Ganugi (1992) estimate that in 1870 debt servicing absorbed 38 percent of  pub- 
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spending at the beginning of the century was 16.2 percent of GDP (France and 
Germany reached 14.4 and 11.5 percent, respectively); in 1950, public spend- 
ing totaled 30.2 percent of GDP, 11.1 points less than France and 3.2 less than 
Germany (Brosio 1993, table 8.1). The major legacy of the active role played 
by the state in economic development, however, does not show up in national 
accounts. A large proportion of companies are owned, directly or indirectly, by 
the public sector? which until very recently showed no willingness to cease 
its improper role of entrepreneur. Measuring the relevance of publicly owned 
corporations by considering the number of employees relative to total employ- 
ment, the OECD (1993) estimates that in  1988 the market share of public en- 
terprises was 15.8 percent (the equivalent figures for France and Germany are 
13.3 and 8.8 percent, respectively).I0 
The most significant increase in public spending occurred in the 1960-90 pe- 
riod:" the share of primary expenditures rose from 27.5 to 44 percent of GDP. 
The increase in  public employment was  even larger, as labor hoarding was 
used as a short-run remedy for structural unemployment. The number of public 
employees more than doubled, rising from 1.6 to 3.6 million. Their share of 
total employment rose from 7.6 to 15.5 percent. 
Expenditure increases were driven by  the expansion of the welfare system 
and public education (fig. 13.4). The main characteristics of the various struc- 
tural reforms can be summarized as follows: (1) Between 1962 and 1969, com- 
pulsory schooling was extended and access to universities eased. (2) In  the 
1955-65 period, public health care programs increased their coverage from 65 
to 90 percent of the population. Starting in 1978, a uniform and universal pub- 
lic health program replaced the heterogeneous regimes. (3) Public pension cov- 
erage was gradually extended to workers (both dependent and self-employed) 
in all economic sectors. Pension financing was gradually switched from fully 
funded to pay as you go. Moreover, the generosity of the system was increased 
by  linking benefits to income earned in the last few years of work. 
Franco (1993) estimates that 59.7 percent of  the increase in the ratio of the 
above spending categories to GDP was determined by the extension of entitle- 
ments to larger shares of  the population, 48.6 percent was caused by the in- 
crease in the amount of  real per capita benefits, while demographic factors 
played only a limited role (13 percent). On the other hand, economic growth 
9. As is well known, the United Nations System of National Accounts classifies firms in the 
market sector and the general government on the basis of the nature of their economic processes, 
irrespective of the owner of the capital. Thus a company producing goods and services to be sold 
on the market is reported in the market sector, even if it is fully owned by  the state and sells at 
prices below average costs. 
10. The largest stake is held in  the energy sector (85.4 percent), followed by  transport and 
telecommunications (8 1.4 percent) and finance and insurance (50.0 percent). Within the European 
context, the size of the latter sector appears particularly relevant. The French and German figures 
are 34.0 and 30.6 percent, respectively. 
11. A detailed analysis of the major causes of the increase in public spending can be found in 
Franco (1993), from which data reported in the text are taken. 306  Nicola Sartor 










Fig. 13.4  Increase in public expenditures, 1960-90  (breakdown of the change in 
the ratio to GDP) 
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Fig. 13.5  Decomposition of the growth of welfare payments and public 
education, 1960-90 
Source: Franc0 (1993). 
and a moderate decline in production costs dampened the rise in  the ratio 
(fig. 13.5). 
At the end of  the expansion process, the Italian welfare system closed the 
gap  vis-A-vis  the  European countries. In  the  1970-90  period,  its  relative 
weight-proxied  by  the  size of  current transfers to households  relative to 
GDP-switched  from 0.5 percentage points below the European Community 
average to 1.6 points above. Its dimension (18.5 percent of  GDP) remained 
smaller than in France and the Scandinavian countries. However, the Italian 307  Generational Accounts for Italy 
system has noteworthy peculiarities, some of which are reflected in the compo- 
sition of benefits. Unemployment allowances are low, while pensions are very 
high. In 1990, the former absorbed only 2 percent of welfare payments (equiva- 
lent to 0.4 of  GDP);’*  the latter, 82 percent (or 15.2 percent of GDP-one  of 
the largest figures among OECD member countries). This situation reflects the 
improper use of  public pensions as a tool for social assistance and, in the case 
of public employees, as a form of deferred income payment. The anomalies in 
the use of public pensions can be summarized in three stylized facts: (1) Long- 
term unemployed living in the least developed areas became eligible for inval- 
idity/disability pensions to some extent regardless of their real health condi- 
tion~.’~  (2)  Anticipated old-age pensions are used as a tool for reducing over- 
manning in declining industrial sectors. (3) Public employees are entitled to a 
seniority pension provided they have paid contributions for 20 years; per capita 
benefits equal 2 percent of  the last salary per each year of  contribution, irre- 
spective of  the age of the re~ipient.’~ 
While the growth of the welfare system persisted during the entire 1960-90 
period, significant spending increases originated from the active role that the 
budget played in alleviating the negative effects produced on firm profitability 
by the supply-side shocks of the early seventies. The first shock was caused by 
struggles over income distribution between profits and wages. The second was 
the well-known deterioration of terms of trade due to the increase in the price 
of oil. Given the downward inflexibility of  real wages (due to the indexation 
12. Given the severe legal constraints on the possibility of making workers redundant, unem- 
ployment is concentrated among young adults facing the labor market for the first time. As these 
individuals are not eligible for unemployment benefits, their care is the responsibility of  their 
families. On the other hand, temporary redundancies among the employed are dealt with under a 
compulsory insurance scheme. Firms pay payroll taxes whose revenue is used to finance 80 percent 
of  wages to workers certified to be temporarily redundant. 
13. Note that this situation does not depend only on individual misbehavior but also on rather 
peculiar official rules. As  an example, Law 639 passed in  1970 ruled that decisions about the 
concession of invalidity pensions should take into account the overall social and economic condi- 
tions prevailing in the province where the claimant is living. As noted by  Onofri (1992, 41). by 
1984-when  the above law was abrogated-the  number of holders of  invalidity pensions had 
almost doubled. 
14. As a consequence, the internal rate of return on pension contributions is extremely variable, 
depending on individual circumstances. Several alternative interpretations can be proposed for 
explaining this rather awkward situation: (1) Because Italian society as a whole was not ready to 
accept female participation in the labor market, early pension benefits allowed many women to 
return to domestic work while children were still living at home. (The minimum working period 
could be further reduced to 15 years if women were married. When the seniority pension for public 
employees was introduced, in 1954, the Parliament asked the government to pass “rules that would 
induce mamed women to go back to their households”; on this point, see Castellino 1996, 98). 
(2)  By increasing the turnover of public workers, the preferential public pension system broadens 
the possibility of obtaining political consensus, as many  members of the government have the 
annual opportunity of recruiting new workers. (3) The provision of benefits after 20 years of work 
represents an effective lock-in that allows public employers to lower wage differentials vis-8-vis 
the private sector (the system obviously causes negative effects on resource allocation and labor 
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mechanism) and the tight legal constraints on the possibility of laying workers 
off, both shocks severely squeezed profit margins. Under these circumstances, 
firm profitability was partially restored by the accommodative stance of mone- 
tary p01icy'~  and by public subsidies (fig. 13.4). Firm subsidization took two 
main forms: (1) workers declared temporarily redundant or employed in firms 
under restructuring received their wages out of public money (the so-called 
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni); (2) the effective rate of payroll tax was de- 
creased by  9.6 percentage points  in the  1976-80  period. The expansion  in 
transfers to firms did not have any major effect on deficits,I6 because it was 
partly financed by direct taxes on wages, whose effective rate increased in the 
same period by 4.6 percentage points. This redistribution was partly reversed 
in the years after 1986, as profit margins recovered following the sharp decline 
in the price of oil. 
Currently, the overall Italian budget does not appear to be out of range when 
compared to other EC countries (table 13.1). The primary budget is in surplus, 
and primary expenditures are below the average of the 12 European countries. 
On the revenue side, the Italian situation does not appear to be out of range 
either. The effective rate of taxes and social security contributions is equal to 
the European average." Direct taxes and social security contributions yield an 
equal share of total revenues (36 percent each). Among direct taxes, the most 
revenue is yielded by the progressive tax on personal income, which is applied 
to all income sources except interest income.IS  Corporate taxes are levied at a 
high nominal rate (53.2 percent), although generous depreciation allowances, 
interest deductability, and a plethora of exemptions reduce the effective tax 
rate, which may even become negative in the case of  debt financing (on this 
point,  see  OECD  1991). A  substantial  fraction  of  revenues  are  collected 
through indirect taxation  (28 percent), particularly  the value-added tax and 
taxes on petroleum products. 
To sum up, the primary burden originates from the excessive deficits run up 
in the  1980-90  period. Briefly, it consists of large interest payments and an 
overall deficit, whose ratios to GDP are more than double the EC average. 
15. As can be  seen from fig. 13.2, the easy money policy produced negative ex post interest 
rates, redistributing income from households (the net creditors) to firms and the government (the 
net debtors). 
16. In the 1976-80  period, the primary deficit declined by  1.9 percentage points of  GDP (I  .7 
according to OECD  estimates of the change in the cyclically adjusted deficit, which can be taken 
as a proxy for discretionary policy). The changes in effective tax rates mentioned in the text are 
taken from Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989), who provide a detailed assessment of Italian macroeco- 
nomic policy during the supply-side shocks. 
17. However, nominal tax rates are often larger than in Europe overall, due to above average tax 
evasion and avoidance. Evasion is concentrated among small businesses and the self-employed, 
whose number is very large by European standards (over 20 percent of total taxpayers). Avoidance 
mainly affects revenues from corporations. 
18. Interest income is taxed at a flat rate, currently 12.5 percent for government bonds and 27 
percent for bank deposits. Table 13.1  Structure of General Government Appropriation Account, 1994 (percent of GDP) 
United  United 
Italy  Germany  France  Kingdom  EC Average"  Statesh 
Government consumption 
Gross public investment 
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Source; European Commission. 
"European countries excluding Italy. 
h1993. 
'Including Italy. 
dNegative numbers are surpluses. 310  Nicola Sartor 
Fig. 13.6  Demographic structure, 1995 
Source: ISTAT (1996). 
13.4  The Demographic Outlook 
The Italian population is  expected  to  experience  substantial changes  in 
structure and size. Since 1977 the fertility rate has been below replacement; 
currently, having reached  1.2, it is the world's  lowest. At the same time, life 
expectancy at birth is on an upward trend, having almost doubled during the 
first 60 years of the century. 
The decline in fertility rates can be appreciated in figure 13.6, where the 
sizes of cohorts alive in  1995 are reported. The absolute number of births has 
dramatically decreased since the midsixties and appears to be stable for the 
past  10 years. This pattern represents three different phenomena pointing in 
the same direction: the number of  women without descendants has steadily 
increased; the number of  households with more than three descendants has 
declined substantially; and in recent years an increasing number of women are 
postponing the time for delivering their first child.19 This overall trend, how- 
ever, encompasses heterogeneous family structures and behaviors, depending 
on regional disparities.20  Simplifying the matter, Italian families can be classi- 
19. Forty percent of cohorts born in  1920 had three or more descendants. The proportion was 
halved in the next 40 years. 
Comparing cohorts born between 1945 and 1958, the proportion of women having their first 
child at ages 30-34  increased by 38 percent. On the other hand, 20 percent fewer women delivered 
their first baby at ages 20-24.  Women aged 25-29  displayed relatively stable behavior (Istituto 
Centrale di Statistica [ISTAT] 1993, table 9). Note, however, that the process of postponing child- 
birth has affected women living in northern Italy much more than those living in the south. Average 
age at the birth of the first child is two years lower in the south. 
20. While these trends characterize the demographic outlook of  many industrialized countries, 
Italy stands out in reconciling changes in reproductive behavior with the preservation of historical 
traditions and convictions; e.g., (1) childless couples have not increased their relevance (less than 
15 percent of  total mamages); (2) out-of-wedlock births remain a minority (6.2 percent of total 
births in 1990), notwithstanding the reduced number of marriages; (3) diverse living arrangements 311  Generational Accounts for Italy 
fied into two different groups (ISTAT 1993): (1) The “northern,” where the 
single child model has been prevalent for a long time (total fertility of cohorts 
born in the second half of the fifties is estimated to be around 1.5), and (2)  the 
“southern,” where 75 percent of families have two or more descendants, and a 
very limited number of women have only one child (less than 10 percent, com- 
pared to more than 35 percent in the north). Southern cohorts who have now 
completed their fertility period still maintain an average number of  descen- 
dants above the replacement level. 
The causes and consequences of the decline in fertility are attracting increas- 
ing public attention. Several explanations have been proposed for recent fertil- 
ity trends, reflecting a multitude of elements (cultural, social, and economic) af- 
fecting households’ reproductive decisions. On one hand, demographers point 
out the consequences of  the exogenous change in the social role of  women, 
characterized by greater equality vis-2-vis men: (1) the increasing female labor 
participation rate, particularly for career professions, and the consequent need 
to reconcile work with household responsibilities,2*  and (2)  the substitution for 
“quantity” (number of children) of “quality” (proxied by per capita expendi- 
tures on health, education, and time devoted to child care). On the other hand, 
economists adhering to the “economics of the family” suggest that the decline 
in fertility is caused by the development of public pension schemes.  According 
to  the theory, generous old-age public  transfers, by  providing an effective 
hedge against the decline in earning capacity, substitute for redistribution from 
middle-aged children to elderly parents.22  Among the consequences of popula- 
tion aging, policymakers are paying particular attention to projected increases 
in public expenditures on pensions and health.23 
For the purposes of  generational accounting, three different demographic 
scenarios have been developed, the first two based on projections recently pub- 
lished by  the National Institute for Population Re~earch.~~  All scenarios are 
are still not common; and (4) the number of legal separations, though on the rise, is still compara- 
tively low. For a recent description of the demographic changes and a suggested interpretation, see 
Palomba (1995). 
21. In the past, the relationship between women’s ages and labor participation rates followed an 
inverted W profile. After an initial increase, the participation rate decreased among cohorts aged 
22-35  as many women withdrew from the labor market in order to have babies. When their chil- 
dren had grown up, their labor participation rate increased again, reaching a second local peak at 
age 43. Since 1986, the age-participation relationship has displayed a single peak, thus following 
an inverted V profile like that usually observed among men. For empirical evidence on this point, 
see Ambrosini and Rossi Sciuml. (1995, 38, chart 2). 
22. Recent empirical evidence for the Italian case is provided by Cigno and Rosati (1996). 
23. The Treasury has recently delivered reports on future trends in public expenditures on educa- 
tion, health, and old age (see Minister0 del Tesoro 1996a, 1996b, 1996~).  An international compar- 
ison of national forecasts for public pension expenditures can be found in European Commission 
(  1996). 
24. See lstituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione (1995). For the purposes of generational account- 
ing, projections have been extended from the year 2044 to 2200. The fertility assumptions underly- 
ing the scenarios (rates respectively constant at the current level and increasing to 1.8 in the year 
2044) resemble very closely the hypotheses adopted by the United Nations (1995) for scenarios C 
and M, respectively. 312  Nicola Sartor 
based on a three-year increase in life expectancy at birth in the next 20 years 
and a zero net migration rate.25  The first projection assumes a gradual increase 
in the fertility rate, which in the year 2005 reaches 1.8 and remains constant 
thereafter. This scenario is adopted as a baseline, as the steady state fertility 
rate equals the completed fertility rate currently estimated for cohorts born in 
the second half of  the fifties. The hypothesis is consistent with the very low 
total fertility rate currently observed provided the current level is a temporary 
phenomenon caused by the abovementioned postponement of age at first child- 
birth. In contrast, the second scenario (fertility constant at 1.3) pessimistically 
assumes that the current rate is structural and will prevail in the long run. The 
third scenario, rather implausible,26  assumes that the fertility rate will rise to 
2.1 (the replacement rate) in the next 20 years. It is intended mainly to contrast 
current generational imbalances with the situation that would prevail under 
long-term constancy of the population. 
Irrespective of the assumptions about the future fertility trend, Italy is bound 
to experience a sharp increase in the elderly dependency ratio (e.g., the fraction 
of Italians aged 65 or older), by almost 50 percent in the next 20 years (from 
25 percent of total population in  1995 to 38 percent in 2015). Starting from 
the year 2015, the dependency ratio follows different patterns, depending on 
the fertility assumption (fig. 13.7). According to the baseline scenario, the de- 
pendency ratio continues to grow until the year 2045, when it reaches a peak 
value of  57 percent. The ratio then declines to the steady state value of  47 
percent. Total population steadily decreases from 57 million individuals to 41 
million in the year 2100. If the fertility rate currently observed prevails in the 
long run (the second scenario), the demographic outlook would be substan- 
tially bleaker: the Italian population would shrink to 20 million, 66 percent of 
which would be citizens aged 65 or 01der.~’ 
13.5  Sources and Data Construction 
Generational accounting requires the disaggregation of the appropriation ac- 
count of the general government into a series of individual accounts. The meth- 
odology followed for the Italian case is described in detail in Franco et al. 
(1994). It mainly consists in distributing total revenues and outlays to the dif- 
ferent generations alive according to age and gender, on the basis of the infor- 
mation obtained from two sample surveys. The first is the Bank of Italy’s Sur- 
25. The number of third world immigrants living in Italy in 1994 is estimated to be between 0.6 
and  1 million. The annual flow is expected to be between 50,000 and  100,OOO.  As many of them 
are undocumented, the overall effect on public finances is uncertain. This is the main reason for 
excluding immigration from the generational accounting demographic scenarios. 
26. Note, however, that the sharp decline in  the Swedish total fertility rate, observed in the 
decades preceding the eighties, was fully consistent with a stable cohort completed fertility rate 
around 2. On this point, see Walker (1995). 
27. Obviously, such a scenario is inconsistent with a zero net migration rate. The “demographic 
vacuum’’ created by the low fertility rate would be filled by relevant immigration flows. 313  Generational Accounts for Italy 
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Fig. 13.7  Alternative demographic projections 
vey  of Household Income and Wealth; the second is the Survey of Consumer 
Expenditure by  the Central Statistical Office (ISTAT). The receipts listed in 
the appropriation accounts are broken down into taxes on capital, labor, and 
commodities, social security contributions, and other revenues. The expendi- 
tures listed in the appropriation accounts need to be classified according to 
the different functions pursued. The reclassification greatly benefited from the 
analysis provided by  Franco (1993) and Franco and Sartor (1990), which al- 
lowed a distinction between spending on health, education, pensions, house- 
hold responsibility payments, and other social security transfers (such as un- 
employment benefits). 
For the above spending and revenue items, the relative profiles of each of the 
91 cohorts (from age 0 to age 90+) were obtained by benchmarking individual 
positions against a 40-year-old male.**  Figure 13.8 summarizes the situation 
by  presenting the levels of net transfers paid or received in 1995 by  Italians. 
Citizens under age 19 receive net transfers, mainly represented by free school- 
ing and health care. As individuals enter the labor market, their fiscal position 
vis-a-vis the state is reversed. The amount of net taxes paid increases with age, 
up to 40 years, and then decreases. The inverted V pattern mainly reflects the 
28. The relative profile for each spending and revenue item is reported in Franco et al. (1994, 
fig. 4.1). An exception to the 40-year-old male benchmark is represented by expenditures on edu- 
cation, the profile for which is obtained by benchmarking individual positions against a 15-year- 
old male. 314  Nicola Sartor 
Average per capita budgetary net revenues in  1995 (thousands of dollars) 
OMale  .Female 
Fig. 13.8  Per capita net taxes as a function of age and gender 
age structure of labor earnings and thus the amount of  direct taxes and social 
security contributions paid. Above age 59, Italians on average become benefi- 
ciaries of  net transfers. As they retire, individuals pay less in social security 
contributions and receive  pension benefits.  Moreover, the amount of health 
care benefits increases monotonically with age. Finally, as regards women, it 
can be noted that the breakeven point occurs at the same age as for men, al- 
though the absolute amounts of  net taxes or transfers are smaller, due to their 
lower participation in the labor market. 315  Generational Accounts for Italy 
Table 13.2  Generational Accounts (thousands of US.  dollars) 
Generation’s  Total 
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Note: Economic growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 
13.6  Italian Generational Accounts 
Table 13.2 presents the baseline generational accounts at every fifth age as- 
suming that the interest rate and the rate of economic growth are 5 and  1.5 
percent, respectively. All amounts are in 1995 U.S. dollars. The accounts indi- 
cate the amount of net taxes that will be paid on average by  an individual in 
the specified age group over the rest of his or her life. For  example, cohorts 
born in 1995 will expect to pay, on average, $65,000 in net taxes, which will 
finance public consumption and part of the interest payments on outstanding 
public debt. The size of generational accounts first rises and then falls with 
age. This reflects the fact that young citizens are years away from their peak 
taxpaying periods, while older individuals, being in or near their retirement 
years, are receiving net transfers from the government. The breakeven age is 
between 45 and 50 for men and is five years earlier for women. On  average, 
citizens aged 50 in  1995 could expect to receive $47,000 in net transfers from 
the government during the rest of their lives. 
The decomposition of generational accounts into the present value of each 
of the various tax payments and transfer receipts is presented in table 13.3. In 
the case of 40-year-old citizens, the generational account of $63,000 represents 
the difference between $21  3,000 in the projected present value of future taxes Table 13.3  Structure of Generational  Accounts for Total Population (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Payments  Receipts 
Generation’s  Net  Direct Taxes  Social Security  Indirect  Direct Taxes  Other  Other  Household 



















































































































18.4  26.7  20.3  6.8 
18.3  32.0  21.6  7.8 
18.0  38.0  22.9  8.9 
17.6  45.1  24.4  10.2 
17.2  53.2  25.9  11.5 
16.7  63.0  27.3  11.7 
16.2  74.6  28.6  11.6 
15.6  X8.7  29.9  11.5 
14.9  105.2  31.2  11.5 
14.0  123.6  32.3  11.6 
13.0  144.7  33.1  11.9 
11.8  165.9  32.9  11.7 
10.6  179.5  32.0  9.2 
9.2  165.3  30.0  5.9 
7.7  136.6  26.6  4.2 
6.4  108.6  22.9  3.5 
4.9  81.4  17.8  2.6 
3.5  58.5  13.2  I .9 







































Note:  Economic growth assumed to be  1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 317  Generational Accounts for Italy 
and $150,000 in the projected present value of  future transfers. The largest 
payment item is social security contributions ($67,000),29  while on the receipt 
side the largest component is public pensions ($ 105,000).30 
Under the hypothesis that budgetary policy will in the long run be consistent 
with financial solvency, table 13.2 also indicates the payment required of gen- 
erations born from 1996 onward. In order to determine the net taxes of future 
generations, it is assumed that all unborn citizens will pay the same amount of 
taxes, adjusted for growth. The comparison between net payments due from 
future generations and payments expected from newborns under the eligibility 
rules established by  current fiscal policy indicates the degree of intergenera- 
tional inequity. If  the Italian government’s fiscal policy were generationally 
balanced, the amounts future generations of Italians will pay  would be equal 
to net  taxes citizens born in  1995 will pay  during their lifetimes. Table  13.2 
shows that the current stance of fiscal policy is severely unbalanced against 
future generations. Net payments required from members of future generations 
will on average exceed the amount paid by cohorts born in 1995 by  $145,000 
(more than double the net taxes paid by newborns). 
The degree of intergenerational imbalance is negatively correlated with the 
fertility rate and positively correlated with the difference between the interest 
rate and the rate of economic growth (the so-called interest-growth gap). Table 
13.4 shows that the generational imbalance will be much greater if the long- 
run fertility rate remains constant at current levels. In this case, net taxes paid 
by  future generations will amount to $275,000, thus increasing the genera- 
tional imbalance from 224 to 325 percent. On the other hand, under the base- 
line demographic outlook, the generational imbalance rises from 224 to 473 
percent if the interest-growth gap increases from 3.5 percentage points (I = 5 
percent, g = 1.5 percent) to 5.5  percentage points (r = 7 percent, g  = 1.5 
percent). For the nine combinations of  interest and growth rate assumptions 
shown in table 13.5, the percentage difference in the treatment of future Ital- 
ians compared to 1995 newborns ranges from 134 to 601 percent. 
13.7  Sources of Generational Imbalance and 
the Impact of Alternative Policies 
In the previous sections it was noted that Italy is characterized by  a large 
public debt, a very low fertility rate, and a generous public pension system. In 
29. This is true for men. For women the largest payment is indirect taxes. As some women do 
not earn their money in the labor market but rather receive transfers from their spouses (or, in the 
case of widows, from social security under the survivors’ pension scheme), the largest payment is 
linked to consumption rather than to income. 
30. The data do not take into account the effects of the pension reform enacted in 1995. An 
estimation of the change in the present value of pension benefits for cohorts born after 1995 is 
currently under way (see Sartor 1998a for preliminary results). A critical assessment of the Italian 
pension system before the reform is proposed by Franco and Frasca (1992). For a description of 
the reform, see Artoni and Zanardi (1996), Canziani and Demekas (1995). Porta and Saracen0 
(1996). and Sartor (1998a). 318  Nicola Sartor 
Table 13.4  Generational Imbalance under Alternative Demographic Projections: 
Present Value of Net Future Taxes (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Fertility Rate 
Low  Baseline  High 








































Note: Base year is 1995. Economic growth assumed to be 1.5 percent: interest rate, 5 percent. 
order to assess the relative importance of these elements in causing the genera- 
tional imbalance, we conduct a sensitivity analysis assuming, in turn, that net 
public debt is zero and that the size and structure of the population remain con- 
stant.3' 
Table 13.6 illustrates the results of the counterfactual simulations; all simu- 
lations are run under the base-case interest and growth rate assumptions. Con- 
trary to common belief, the most important source of generational imbalance 
is the pending demographic transition. As the number of future births shrinks, 
the overall primary surplus needed to keep public debt on a sustainable path 
must be paid by  a decreasing number of  citizens, whose per capita net tax 
payments increase. If  the structure of  the population remained constant, the 
generational imbalance would be less than a tenth of  the baseline imbalance 
(18 instead of 224 percent). On the other hand, if it is assumed, counterfactu- 
ally, that public debt were zero, the generational imbalance would be less than 
half of  the baseline (98 instead of 224 percent). This exercise indicates that 
most of the imbalance in policy has nothing to do with officially labeled gov- 
ernment debt. It illustrates the point that focusing solely on debt can be mis- 
leading in assessing a government's generational policy. Combining the two 
hypotheses (zero debt and constant population) produces a generational imbal- 
31. No demographic change means that the number of Italians in  each age-gender group in 
future years equals the corresponding 1995 number of Italians. Clearly, such a hypothesis is made 
for illustrative purposes only. A more realistic assumption would be a gradual increase in  the 
fertility rate to the replacement level. As can be seen from the last column in table 13.4, such a 
scenario would still determine a generational imbalance against future generations; its size, how- 
ever, is smaller than in the baseline case (207 vs. 224 percent). 319  Generational Accounts for Italy 
Table 13.5  Generational Imbalance under Alternative Macroeconomic 
Scenarios: Present Value of Net Future Taxes for Total Population 
(thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Productivity Growth (%) 








































Note: Base year is 1995. Exchange rate assumed to be 0.61 dollars per 1,000 Italian lire 
Table 13.6  Sources of Generational Imbalance: Present Value of Net Future 
Taxes (thousands of US.  dollars) 
Constant 
Baseline  Zero Debt  Population 

















































Note: Base year is 1995. Fertility rate assumed to be 1.8; economic growth, 1.5 percent; interest 
rate, 5 percent. 
ance against  the current  generation; the percentage difference between  net 
taxes paid by future generations and those paid by cohorts born in 1995 would 
be -52  percent (table 13.6, last column). 
An alternative way to assess the magnitude of the generational imbalance is 
to consider the sizes of the immediate and permanent increases in alternative 
tax rates or cuts in alternative spending categories required to restore genera- 320  Nicola Sartor 
Table 13.7  Changes Needed to Restore Generational Balance (percent 
of baseline) 
Policy Option  Change (%) 
Cut in government purchases  87.9 
Cut in transfer payments (pensions)  40.0 
Increase in income tax revenue  188.8 
Increase in all tax revenues 
(including social security 
contributions)  61.4 
Nore: Economic growth assumed to be  1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent 
tional balance. Table 13.7 reports the results of four alternative experiments: 
an increase in income taxes or all taxes and social security contributions; or a 
cut in pensions or government consumption. As the sizes of the above budget 
items differ by large amounts, the percentage modifications needed to restore 
generational balance vary considerably. The largest difference is required if 
only direct taxes are increased (189 percent). The smallest is required if pen- 
sions are reduced (40 percent). The latter figure approximates the size of the 
cuts in future generations’ pension benefits enacted by the 1995 reform (Sartor 
1998a). Had the reform been applied pro rata to all living generations, the 
Italian generational accounts would now be very close to balance. 
13.8  Conclusions 
Since the eighties, stabilization of the ratio of public debt to GDP has been 
the main target of  macroeconomic  fiscal policy. According  to conventional 
measures, the target was reached in 1995, as public debt settled at around 125 
percent of GDP. Generational accounting acknowledges the great efforts made 
by the Italian government to put public finances on a sound footing. A measure 
of the progress in fiscal consolidation can be derived by calculating the genera- 
tional imbalance under the assumption that the size and structure of population 
remain constant through time. Under the constant population hypothesis, the 
first set of generational accounts showed a generational imbalance of  127 per- 
cent in 1990.32  In 1993, the imbalance was reduced to 63 percent by discretion- 
ary budgetary policy. If a constant population were a reasonable assumption, the 
preceding analysis would show that fiscal policy in  1995 had almost reached 
generational fairness (the imbalance being further reduced to 18 percent). 
Conventional debt and deficit measures, however, focus on the very short 
run and ignore the pressures that the current demographic transition is placing 
on the budget. When incorporating the demographic change, the preceding 
analysis has shown that in 1995 the fiscal policy stance was far from balanced 
32. See Franco et al. (1992, table 6), where the baseline macroeconomic scenario was the same 
as for this study (ix., g = 1.5 percent, r = 5 percent). 321  Generational Accounts for Italy 
from a generational point of view. If current tax and spending programs remain 
unchanged, the percentage difference in net lifetime payments between future 
and newborn generations is 224 percent. The size of  the imbalance remains 
virtually constant (207 instead of 224 percent) even if the fertility rate were to 
reach the replacement level in the next 20 years. It is substantially smaller, 
however, if the pension reform enacted in 1995 is taken into 
The Italian fiscal policy debate is currently focused on European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). The desire to join the EMU is compelling the 
Italian government to further restrict its fiscal policy stance in order to fulfill 
the Maastricht criteria of  a deficit-to-GDP ratio below  3 percent and a de- 
clining debt-to-GDP ratio. The above targets have been criticized by many ob- 
servers. Economists criticize the Maastricht fiscal rules for their lack of theo- 
retical  foundation^.^^ Laymen criticize the criteria for the excessive restriction 
that would be placed on disposable incomes. While it can be agreed that the 
Maastricht fiscal rules are not well founded theoretically, the results derived 
from generational accounting show that the prescription for fiscal consolida- 
tion over and above what is needed for achieving short-term debt stabilization 
can offer a sounder theoretical foundation. 
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